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The Defense Resources Management Institute specializes in four broad educational areas:
• Economic analysis of the public sector • Operations research of public sector decision problems • Public budgeting and fiscal management • Defense organizations and management methods For more information about our educational and technical assistance activities, please visit our website at http://www.nps.navy.mil/drmi or email us at drmiadmin@nps.edu.
I. Introduction
Jordan is a recent entrant to the domestic defense industry with the establishment of King Abdullah II Design and Development Bureau (KADDB) in 1999. As a measure of the importance Jordan attaches to the creation of this fledgling industry, KADDB was established by royal decree, and reports directly to the King of Jordan. 1 KADDB is to provide scientific and technical services to the Jordan Armed Forces, to supply defense and commercial equipment customized to meet the needs of clients in the Middle East and North Africa, and to assist Jordan in creating a sustainable industrial base that would complement commercial civilian applications. 2 Jordan markets itself as the "Gateway to the Middle East" and within that context, KADDB has positioned itself as the "Technology Partner of Choice for the Middle East and North Africa."
In contrast to other countries that have developed domestic defense industries for strategic reasons, Jordan's primary reasons appear to be economic . 3 As part of an economic reform program, the defense industrial initiative intends to jumpstart 1 KADDB publication. 2 To facilitate the establishment of a civilian commercial industry, KADDB and the Royal Scientific Society (RSS) signed an agreement early 2005 to establish a commercial industrial research center, the Center for Applied Industrial Research (CAIR). CAIR technical staff will consist of scientists from both organizations. CAIR's stated goal will be to advance Jordan's science based industries by focusing on fields of research such as materials science, energy, water resources, biomechanics, nanotechnology, and safety and security. The UK's Defense Evaluation and Research Agency (DERA) identified these fields of research as areas that are attracting resources for research and development in NATO (Jane's International Defense Review, 2002) 3 The motivations for domestic defense production are to reduce dependence on outside arms suppliers, to enhance a nations status in the international community, to facilitate the transfer of technology, and, over time, to gain economically. South Africa's stated goal in developing its defense industry in the early 1960s was (Brauer 2002) to provide the country with a reliable source of arms after its increasing isolation from the world as a result of its apartheid policies. After the emergence of a new political order in 1994, following the election of an ANC led government, and the lifting of the UN arms embargo, the defense industry underwent substantial restructuring with the new government struggling to justify maintaining the existence of the industry. Eventually, the justification focused on trade, economics, and employment maintenance and creation. (Batchelor and Willett 1998) . Brazil built an defense industry for national security to enhance its ambitions both as a regional and global power (Freeman 2002) and as a preemptive strategic move (Brauer 2002 In this study, I review the Jordanian defense industry and assess the success and failure of this industry as a stimulus to economic development. In addition, I evaluate the resulting employment creation, technology transfer, improved trade, and both backward and forward linkages to the civilian industrial sectors. I compare the economic achievements of the defense industry to those of the Qualified Economic Zones (QIZ), another major government facilitated economic development mechanism.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section two reviews the economics of military industries. Section three provides an introduction to Jordan and the evolution of its economy. Section four details KADDB and describe its role in the Jordanian 4 KADDB, Jane's IDR 2002. 5 Looney (1988) economy. Section five reviews KADDB's accomplishments, compares it that of the QIZs and the last section offers concluding remarks.
II. Economics of Military Industries
The creation of indigenous defense industries in developing countries is motivated by a variety of strategic, political, and economic factors. In addition, the industries demand for highly skilled labor could deprive civilian industries of resources needed to develop.
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Krause (1992) enumerates a process, an eleven step "ladder of production," by which a developing country would progress from an arms importer to a fully independent arms producer ( Table 2) . Krause explains such models as being descriptive of the evolution, rather than the linear progression, of the defense production process. Brauer (2002) points out that some countries may chose to enter into the defense production industry at entry points beyond stage one. In addition, some countries may chose to focus on different entry points for different arms. He distinguishes between complete weapons systems production and weapons modules development. Although the US, and to a lesser extent, countries such as France, the UK, and Russia are technological 9 Brzoska (1995) illustrates this point using India as an example. After repeatedly purchasing technology on the international market, India failed to advance the technology on its own and fell behind the subsequent advances in the technological frontier made in the US and Western Europe. 10 Batchelor and Willett (1998) make the case for South Africa.
innovators in defense production, Krause (1992) argues that most arms production efforts seem to end between stage eight and nine with progress beyond limited R&D being rare.
While the ladder of production is descriptive of the evolution of the defense production process, it does not capture the time progression of the development of indigenous arms industries. Figure 1 depicts the time progression of the eleven steps of the ladder of production as a function of the time required to attain each level. The process is nonlinear with increasing opportunity cost for a country to reach the higher stages. The production process through the first five steps can skip levels or enter at any level.
However, it would be difficult for a country to ascend to higher stages by skipping lower stages. Comparative advantage would suggest that countries should produce at a level with the ratio of their marginal cost to marginal benefit equal to that of other arms producers.
Offsets, an industrial compensation practice imposed by the buyer country as a condition of purchase on the seller company, have become a popular method for stimulating domestic economic activity. While civil offset programs are not permissible for developed countries under Article XXIII of the Government Procurement Act of the World Trade Organization, offsets from defense procurement are an option available to all countries. The offsets can be directly linked to defense contracts such as technology transfer, co-production, or local assembly related directly to the equipment purchased or they can be indirectly sourced where civilian, military goods, or services are unrelated to the defense equipment purchased. Although, the costs and benefits of offsets are debatable, no compelling evidence points to the positive impact of offsets on a domestic economy. This pattern is consistent across countries as varied as Brazil, India, and Saudi Arabia where offsets were used to stimulate a variety of economic and industrial policy initiatives.
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South Africa presents a good example of progress in indigenous defense production. Batchelor and Willett (1998) Defense production is less efficient than civilian industry as its primary aim is raising weapons systems performance by technological improvements, rather than cost reduction through a streamlined production process. In addition, investment in defense production and poor choices of military technology led to underinvestment in civilian industries for the same countries.
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The evidence in support of the economic gains from establishing military industries is quite mixed for developing countries. Devarajan, Swaroop, and Zou (1996) test whether the share allocated to various components of government expenditures is associated with higher growth. They find that defense expenditures appear to have a negative influence on economic growth whereas consumption oriented public expenditures appear to positively influence economic growth. Dunne (1996) substantiates their findings and affirms that reallocations from defense spending to other forms of government spending have been shown to increase employment in developing countries. Batchelor and Willett (1998) analyze the economic significance of South Africa's defense industry and conclude that despite increasing numbers of highly skilled workers employed in the industry, it absorbed scarce labor resources making them unavailable to the civilian industry. Brazil's economic gains from its weapons industry are mixed Although, in absolute numbers, about 200,000 jobs were created at the height of the industry's success, a trivial amount for a country of Brazil's size. 13 They also point out that domestic defense production remained a net user of foreign exchange with no positive impact on the country's technological performance. Foreign exchange earnings are questionable when balanced against the cost of acquiring technology and components.
The resulting development and success of the Brazilian civilian aircraft industry came at 12 Batchelor and Willett (1998) report the capital intensity of the arms industry in South Africa being double the average of the manufacturing sector as a whole. Hartley and Sandler (1995) highlight the fact that investment in indigenous arms production may have negative resource allocation effects by crowding out civilian investments. 13 Brigagao (1986 The main challenges facing Jordan are reducing dependence on foreign grants, reducing the budget deficit, and creating investment incentives to promote job creation.
A substantial percentage of the population, 38% is under the age of fourteen resulting in a rapid increase in the working age population. Jordan currently has a large disparity between its official and unofficial employment rates at 15% and 30%
respectively. 15 The GNI per capita in 2004 was $2140, which afforded the population one of the highest regional per capita disposable income compared to other emerging 14 Brzoska (1995) reports that the recent conflicts in the Middle East, Gulf War I, Gulf War II, have dealt a serious blow to the defense industries of developing nations. The superiority of advanced technology weapons increased the demand for US and European weapons and closed the market for developing countries. In an interview with Gen. Div. Werlon Roure, Director of the Directoria de Material Belico/Brazilian Army Staff, 01/17/94, reported by Bittencourt (1994) , the General summarizes the causes of the Brazilian defense industry crises and points out that the "Gulf War gave absolute dominance of the Middle East market to the United States and some European producers." India's case differs from Brazil in that it is a situation of over ambitious expectations. The country had faltered in keeping up with the current arms technology despite repeated purchasing of advanced technology. Defense News, January 9, 2006 reports on the poor quality of domestically produced defense equipment. In addition, Argentina's defense productions program, started in the 1950s, faltered despite the existence of a relatively advanced civilian industrial base because of over ambitions expectations. 15 CIA, The World Fact Book, 2005. countries. The relatively comfortable economic situation can be credited to the country's ability to maintain social and political stability. Jordan depends on one of the world's highest share of workers' remittances, about 20% of GDP, to support its balance of payments.
In the early 1990s, the Jordanian economy was highly regulated and recovering from an exchange rate and banking crisis. The country was struggling to absorb Jordanian refugees as a result of the Gulf War. While economic growth was due to housing investment, external trade and exports were predominantly mining and agricultural products. The government controlled a significant share of industrial production and regulated commodity prices.
Since the early 1990s, Jordan has undertaken some broad economic reforms aimed at stabilization by reducing the budget deficit and the foreign debt through forgiveness and rescheduling. In addition, the Jordanians reduced trade tariffs and regulations, freed most commodity prices, and pursued a market orientation primarily through privatization. 16 The government also has liberalized the trade regime sufficiently the Jordanian government to both raise the retail petroleum product prices and sales tax base. The increase in petroleum product prices resulted in a spike in consumer price inflation and a marked increase in the current account deficit. Jordan's export market, which is heavily dependent on exports to Iraq, was also affected by the war. The market recovered quickly, however, due to the Iraq rebuilding effort.
Historically, Jordan has had difficulty attracting investments. 17 Substantial differences exist between the FTA and QIZ. US officials established the legal framework for QIZs in 1996 by offering special duty and quota free access to goods produced with specified minimum Jordanian, Palestinian, and Israeli content. To qualify a product in the QIZ, a minimum of 35% of the product's appraised value must be produced in the QIZ. The 35% may be arrived at using one of three methods. The first is 11.7% from a Jordan QIZ, 8% from Israel (7% for high tech). The remaining content may come from Jordan, Israel, West Bank/Gaza, and the USA. The second method requires that Jordanian and Israeli manufacturers maintain at least 20% of the total production cost. The third involves a combination of the first two methods. Textiles and apparel have been the primary products of QIZ to circumvent the high US custom duty on these items. Jordan feared that the 2005 expiration of the WTO multi-fiber agreement, which would allow China unimpeded access to the US market, would render the QIZs unprofitable. The Bush administration, however, reimposed textile quotas in some categories imported from China allowing a limited increase in imports to the US. been a rapid growth in merchandise exports especially in textile and pharmaceutical products. A significant portion of export growth is due to duty and quota free access to US markets from the QIZs. Table 4 details the QIZ labor force. Table 5 lists the QIZs, their status, and their ownership. Table 6 lists the QIZ companies and ownership.
IV. KADDB
In the early 1990s, Jordan's military industry expertise lay with the Royal Maintenance Corps (RMC), which was charged with maintenance, overhaul, and limited upgrades of equipment. The largest facility was the King Hussein Main Workshops (KHMW) in Zarqa. The RMC rebuilt armored vehicles, performed some redesign on the British built Alvis Scorpion tracked reconnaissance vehicle and undertook the modernization of armored fighting vehicles and armored personnel carriers. 21 The RMC 19 There is no documented case of defense production in developing nations without government involvement. The case of Mexico reinforces this argument where a much higher level of defense production would be expected than currently exists. However, the consensus is that there is no political will to establish an defense industry even though there is a high level of civilian industrial capability. 20 Many explanations have been provided for the increase in foreign workers. They include the perception that foreign workers are more efficient, willing to work longer hours, and have higher skills than local workers. However, Kardoosh and Khouri (2004) point out that the companies that are Jordanian owned have a small proportion of foreign workers and in some cases none at all. 21 The M60A1 main battle tank was upgraded to A3 standard. In addition, the Khalid (Chieftain) and Tariq (Centurion) MBTs were modified and routine and heavy maintenance performed to them at KHMW. Jane's, 18 March, 1997 outfitted some Scorpions with TOW anti-tank missiles, and others with a mortar carrier.
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This work was part of a plan to create an indigenous military industrial capability known as the Jordan National Industry. KADDB is to develop the capability to upgrade aircraft and integrate aircraft systems.
Appendix A provides an overview of KADDB products. 25 Table 7 details the companies KADDB formed, the strategic partners involved, and the employment generated.
KADDB does not have access to offset agreements to help develop its capability since Jordan currently does not have offset agreements with any of its suppliers and, quite
probably, does not have the purchasing power to be able to aggressively pursue offsets.
However, since the benefits of offsets, both those that are direct and indirect, are questionable, it may be in Jordan's best interest to refrain from pursuing this option; this is especially true because arms purchasers may actually pay a higher price when seeking offsets. The level of technology used in the QIZs does not extend beyond garment assembly (sewing, ironing and washing). As such, the technology transfer from the QIZs into Jordan is minimal. Applying Krause's production ladder, the QIZs probably operate at an equivalent of level one with the ability to perform simple maintenance work.
KADDB, using Krause's "ladder of production" has reached level five by having attained the capability of performing final assembly of less sophisticated weapons with some local component production and to a small extent may have reached level six of co-production or complete licensed production of less sophisticated weapons. KADDB has started operating at level seven of limited R&D improvements to local license produced arms for some systems. KADDB is clearly transferring more technology into Jordan than the QIZs. Comparing the technology transferred by KADDB and the civilian sector into the country, it appears to be at about the same level for equipment manufacturing and 28 Based on information provided by the Ministry of Trade and Industry. The author considers jobs that are described as supervisory, maintenance, IT, personnel, accounting, nursing, public relations, and translating as requiring technical skills. Packing, cutting, sewing, security, driving, and washing are not technical. 29 Based on information provided by KADDB, the number of direct KADDB employees is 300 with approximately 30 in management, 200 skilled technically and the remainder semiskilled and non-skilled. The joint venture companies employ around 950 people. KADDB was unable to provide a breakdown by skills for the joint venture companies.
assembly. 30 However, the IT transfer into the country appears to be higher than that available in the civilian sector.
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Little evidence exists to confirm the QIZ or the KADDB success in creating strong backward and forward linkages into the economy because of Jordan's narrow industrial base. QIZs essentially transform imported raw material into a finished product.
Little of what goes into creating a final product originates domestically and the value added comes from the transformation (i.e. fabric into clothing). Table 5 lists the number of subcontractor companies created in the QIZ zones to support QIZ activites. All these companies are connected in some way to the garment industry
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. There is no employment or sales data available for these companies. As it takes very little capital investment to establish a garment facility, these industries are easy to relocate to other countries. The concern is that the QIZs located in Jordan could migrate to Turkey, Morocco, or Egypt, nations with a larger domestic industrial base, when these nations conclude similar arrangements with the US. 33 KADDB seems to make a policy of partnering with a domestic civilian entity for its projects. As such, these civilian entities may be able to transfer their knowledge and experience into the civilian economy. What is not clear at this time is the extent of these industries reliance on defense work and whether they have been able to branch out into the non-defense sector.
30 Civilian joint ventures were concluded to maintain and produce the Russian Ka-266 helicopter and to manufacture and assemble of Land Rover vehicles activities similar to those of KADDB. Jane's Information Group, August 1, 2004. 31 This is based on the premise that the staff of the Prince Faisal Information Technology Center have had to receive training outside Jordan because the technology and the skilled staff are not available in the country. 32 No details exist as to what business these companies are engaged in. However, all have a variant of the word textile or garment in their name. There is no employment or sales data available for these companies. They are small privately held business not involved in export and presumably provide support services such as packing and laundering. 33 The majority of QIZs are owned by non-Jordanian. Kardoosh and Khouri (2004) 36 Seabid Aviation Jordan in its online publicity material, http://www.seabirdaviationjordan.com/about_us.shtm reports the sale of equity to the Dabin Group, a regional company. However, the date, size, and conditions of the transaction are not reported. The arms market is a buyer's market, especially for low technology products.
Demand is for high technology, particularly after the recent engagements in the Middle
East proved the superiority of technically advanced weapons systems. As such, KADDB will face intense competition in breaking into the international market and needs an attractive opening to take advantage of economies of scale or dual use technology in its production.
Skilled labor is an essential input into any business venture. As such, KADDB should offer competitive wages to retain skilled labor, and should actively recruit and train personnel from outside the armed forces to avoid introspection and to provide a diverse perspective and a cadre of technically skilled personnel.
KADDB is realistic in its expectations of the industries it is seeking to establish.
No attempt has been made to attempt to import or deal with technology beyond its reach and has accepted a certain level of technological dependence. Nonetheless, it needs to maintain a high quality of research and development to guarantee its survival.
KADDB has made serious efforts to recruit domestic civilian industrial partners and, perhaps working to its advantage, has no offset agreements with any outside suppliers. In addition, KADDB has established an engineering group, manufacturing group, programs group, and several other departments including marketing, business development, supply, operations, and strategic studies that are hopefully engaged in long range regional and security planning.
KADDB could potentially benefit from Jordan's position as a "gateway to the
Iraqi market" and establish a niche market. What remains to be seen is whether KADDB can develop the regional markets that it sees for its products and whether it can expand and reach the goals it has set for itself of being self-sufficient and operating without government subsidies Marine products: KABBD is a joint venture with Hurricane Engineering will provide complete solutions for marine operators, from design, development, and manufacture to after sales support.
A number of cooperative programs have been instituted on the back of recent projects:
electrical equipment and manufacturing repair facility operated by CLS Jordan, electrical harness production with Raytech of Austria; the establishment of a forward logistics base 38 Defense News 03/30/2006 reposts that ITT wants to establish a regional facility for vehicle maintenance and upgrade at an existing KADDB facility in Zarka, Jordan. Currently, KADDB's facility in Zarka is being used to upgrade M800 and M900 series trucks and could be forced to close at the end of the project for lack of work. In addition, Defense News 03/30/2006 reports that Thales is in talks with KADDB to capture some of the Iraqi vehicle fleet's upgrades. KADDB would act as a prime contractor and systems integrator while Thales would supply the electronic equipment. Overhaul, refurbishment and rudimentary modification capabilities 3.
Assembly of imported components, simple licensed production 4.
Local production of components or raw materials 5.
Final assembly of less sophisticated weapons; some local component production. 6.
Co-production or complete licensed production of less sophisticated weapons 7.
Limited R&D improvements to local license -produced arms 8.
Limited independent production of less sophisticated weapons; limited production of more advanced weapons 9.
Independent R&D and production of less sophisticated weapons 10.
Independent R&D and production of advanced arms with foreign components 11.
Completely independent R&D production 1 Capability of performing simple maintenance 2
Overhaul, refurbishment and rudimentary modification capabilities 3
Assembly of imported components, simple licensed production 4
Local production of components or raw materials 5
Final assembly of less sophisticated weapons; some local component production. 6
Co-production or complete licensed production of less sophisticated weapons 7
Limited R&D improvements to local license-produced arms 8
Limited independent production of less sophisticated weapons; limited production of more advanced weapons 9
Independent R&D and production of less sophisticated weapons 10 Independent R&D and production of advanced arms with foreign components 11
Completely independent R&D production Source: Krause (1992) 
